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When a city outlaws the most affordable way to earn a living selling food, it
builds inequity into the local food economy. It holds back people who could sell
healthy, affordable, innovative, or culturally significant food, but who don’t have
the budgets to finance brick-and-mortar businesses. It holds back people who could
create jobs or start businesses that become pillars of the community. It forces smallbudget entrepreneurs to choose between selling against the law at great risk or giving
up on entrepreneurship because it is unaffordable.
By removing excessive regulatory barriers to start a pushcart food business,
reformers expand economic liberty for people. We free them to bring culture,
cuisine, and commerce to the street corner. We narrow the gap between the shadow
economy and the formal economy. We allow vendors the dignity of so-called
legitimacy.
Or do we?
* Elizabeth Kregor is the Director of the Institute for Justice Clinic on Entrepreneurship (IJ Clinic on
Entrepreneurship) and a Lecturer at Law at the University of Chicago Law School. This Essay and the
campaign underpinning it were buoyed, boosted, and balanced by my colleagues at the Institute for
Justice, particularly Brooke Fallon. Gregg Kettles provided a helpful sounding board in addition to his
eye-opening scholarship. The participants of the “Establishing Equity in Our Food System”
Symposium at the University of California, Irvine School of Law provided insight, and support, and
inspiration.
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Legalizing an activity is not always freeing it. Legalizing food businesses
involves regulating them. The new laws may make business harder for vendors than
it was in the days without legal options. Lawyers and activists who advocate for
legalization must take care to do more good than harm.
This Essay presents a case study of a campaign to legalize pushcart food
vendors in Chicago in order to explore the interaction of law reform and the shadow
economy. In this Essay, I will introduce the need for expanding economic liberty
and the challenges of crafting helpful legal reform to structure that liberty when
regulating rather than deregulating. I will share lessons learned about how to close
the gap between the informal economy and the formal economy. I will tackle the
question of how legal advocates for informal entrepreneurs can help, rather than
hurt, their cause. How can we structure our laws to optimize liberty for new food
producers?
In writing this Essay, I aspire to follow closely in the footsteps of Jane Larson’s
essay Informality, Illegality, and Inequality.1 Larson described the areas known as
“colonias,” the unregulated settlements outside of Texas cities near the Mexico
border, where people buy land and build homes with the materials and skills they
can acquire, and where homes are neither required to comply with a building code
nor connected to basic physical infrastructure, like water, sewage, and roads.2
Larson used the colonias as a case study to explain the deep conundrum of the
informal economy and to propose an approach to legal reform that might be both
workable for the residents of the colonias and compatible with the lawyerly demand
for the rule of law.3 Her work did not go so far as to test the practicality of lobbying
and legislating her proposed reforms into action.4 In this Essay, I will offer a
corrective based on the case study of the vendors in Chicago and the experiences
of passing laws through the legislature with the blessing of the Department of Public
Health.
While discussing the “informal economy” or “shadow economy,” I will apply
the definition provided so succinctly by John Cross: “Informal economic activity
comprises those economic strategies that contravene laws regulating how business
should be conducted, but not laws specifying what business may be conducted.”5 In
doing so, I am tracking most scholarship in law and urban planning, but take a
distinct approach from the highly influential sociological study of the underground
economy in Chicago, Off the Books by Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh.6 Venkatesh declined
to demarcate licit and illicit activities in his in-depth investigation of inner-city

1. Jane E. Larson, Informality, Illegality, and Inequality, 20 YALE L. & POL’ Y REV. 137 (2002).
2. Id. at 140.
3. Id. at 144.
4. Id. at 182.
5. JOHN C. CROSS, INFORMAL POLITICS: STREET VENDORS AND THE STATE IN MEXICO CITY
29–30 (1998).
6. SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF THE
URBAN POOR (2006).
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economics.7 Since I am not primarily focused on the relationships among the people
in these businesses, but their relationships to the law itself, I will make the
distinction. My task here is to study the merits and techniques behind legalization,
which will likely be different when legalizing a how than when legalizing a what.
Like Larson’s, this Essay will struggle with the basic conundrum for American
lawyers trying to think about the shadow economy. Our fundamental belief that
everyone should be treated equally under the law is tough to reconcile with our
belief that poor people should not be punished for meeting their basic needs in an
honorable but noncompliant way. Institutionalizing a system where the law does
not apply to all, or accepting laws that are broader than we mean to implement,
impairs the rule of law. For activists and public interest lawyers taking on the task
of writing the law, these questions take on an urgency. In this Essay, I hope to give
my fellow activists some inspiration for how to proceed into the conundrum.
In Part I, I will provide background on a campaign to legalize vendors in
Chicago. The campaign was successful in getting a reformed ordinance passed, but
vendors have not taken advantage of the new license in the first year. In Part II, I
explore the several reasons why it is important to push to legalize vending. In Part
III, I look to the other side and examine the arguments against pushing for legal
regulation of an occupation in the shadow economy. Lastly, in Part IV, I introduce
strategies aimed at maximizing the benefits of legalization while minimizing the
costs.
I. SIDEWALK VENDORS IN CHICAGO
Until recently, almost all food carts were illegal in Chicago. A vendor could
get a license to be a peddler selling whole, uncooked fruits and vegetables on the
go; a produce merchant selling whole, uncooked fruits and vegetables from a
temporary stand (as long as half the business operations were in an area underserved
by grocery stores); or a mobile frozen desserts vendor selling packaged frozen
desserts from a nonmotorized vehicle.8 Since it is illegal to operate a business in
Chicago without a license,9 the absence of a license category made all other food
carts illegal.10
7. Id. at 11.
8. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 4-8-010, 7-38-130, 7-38-140 (1990) (amended Sept. 24, 2015),
https://chicago.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2321146&GUID=14EB1A4A-849A
-4502-B254-E9D19E6EADF0&Options=Advanced&Search= [https://perma.cc/6JML-5X7S]
(concerning mobile vendors).
9. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 4-4-010, -020 (1990).
10. Please note that the focus of this Essay is on the legal status of nonmotorized food carts, such
as old-fashioned pushcarts or bicycle trailers. Food trucks are governed by different laws in Chicago
and have followed their own twisted history. Trucks can be licensed and operate legally, but there are
significant restrictions on them. They are not allowed to stay in place more than two hours, and they
are not allowed to park within 200 feet of a business selling food unless they are at one of a few specially
designated parking spots for food trucks. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 7-38-115 (1990). The Institute for
Justice is presently suing the City of Chicago due to the protectionist and unconstitutional proximity
restriction. Leonor Vivanco, Food Fight, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 2012, 2012 WL 24307804.
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Chicago was one of the only major cities in the country that banned all food
carts selling prepared foods on the sidewalks.11
Notably, food carts are legal on land owned by the Chicago Park District. The
Park District in Chicago has its own independent governing body.12 It has privatized
concessions in the parks and beaches, and the private company approves vendors
of many kinds to operate in the parks (in exchange for a fee and a cut of the
revenues).13 So a vendor might be perfectly acceptable at the edge of a park, but not
on the sidewalk that borders the park.
Nonetheless, there has been an extensive industry of food carts operating in
Chicago.14 The numbers are uncertain but significant. While food vendors are often
studied by scholars investigating the shadow economy because they are so visible
and so exposed to penalties, they are notoriously difficult to count.15 They work
varied hours and varied days, depending on their customer demand and the
demands of other obligations.16 They move. They are not registered because there
is no registry for them. (For all these same reasons, vendors are hard to organize
for grassroots activism.) Vendors and reporters have estimated 1500 to 2000, but
the methodology of reaching that number is unclear.17
Chicago’s vendors are predominantly Mexican immigrants.18 They sell
traditional Mexican street food, like tamales, elotes, chicharron, and cut fruit dressed
in lime juice and chili pepper. They are easy to find in Chicago’s neighborhoods
with significant Mexican populations. They are most dense in the neighborhood of
Little Village, especially along Twenty-sixth Street.19 Twenty-sixth Street offers a
literal and figurative taste of Mexico, and the Mayor has lauded the business strip

11. ERIN NORMAN ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, STREETS OF DREAMS: HOW CITIES CAN
CREATE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY BY KNOCKING DOWN PROTECTIONIST BARRIERS TO STREET
VENDING 23 (2011).
12. Concession Program, CHI. PARK DISTRICT, http://www.chicagoparkdistrict.com/doingbusiness/concession-program/ [https://perma.cc/CK8Q-ZCM8] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
13. Id.
14. See Robin Peterson, Taking It to the Streets, IN THESE TIMES (Sept. 23, 2009), http://
inthesetimes.com/article/4911/taking_it_to_the_streets [https://perma.cc/KL9A-ZGHZ]; Aixa
Velez & Araceli Pedroza, Chicago’s Latino Street Vendors Look for Justice, GAPERS BLOCK (Mar. 19,
2010), http://gapersblock.com/drivethru/2010/03/19/chicagos_latino_street_vendors_look_for_
justice/ [https://perma.cc/LTT2-3HGS].
15. Larson, supra note 1, at 158 (“No one can say with certainty how many people work, buy,
and find shelter within the informal economy in this country.”).
16. See NORMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 9; Mike Sula, The Great Tamale Migration, CHI. READER,
Sept. 19, 2013, 2013 WL 34248736.
17. See, e.g., Hal Dardick, Chicago a Step Closer to Licensing Food Carts, and Some Vendors Happy,
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-chicago-foodcarts-met-20150916-story.html [https://perma.cc/NF3C-XHWE].
18. Michael Lucci & Hilary Gowins, Chicago’s Food-cart Ban Costs Revenue, Jobs, Special Report,
ILL. POL’ Y INST. (Aug. 2015), https://files.illinoispolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
Foodcart_Paper1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BUX9-73TY].
19. Fran Spielman, The “2nd Mag Mile”?, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 16, 2012, 2012 WL 5644145.
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as the second-highest grossing in sales tax revenues, after the tony Magnificent
Mile.20
Not all vendors operating in Chicago’s shadow economy are Mexican
immigrants,21 and there are certainly many African American vendors who set up
tables and carts selling food, including a man who has acquired a bit of fame for
selling Mississippi Delta tamales.22 I am less familiar with their story and their
experiences. They have not been historically organized as activists for vending rights
in Chicago, and they were not a part of our legalization campaign in the end.
The Institute for Justice Clinic on Entrepreneurship and I got involved in a
campaign to legalize Chicago’s sidewalk vendors in 2011.23 The initial strategy was
to ride the wave of food truck popularity, but Chicago passed tough, expensive, and
restrictive laws for food trucks in 2012.24 The Street Vendors Justice Coalition
(SVJC) came together to push Chicago to be friendlier to vendors. The founding
members were the IJ Clinic on Entrepreneurship (legal advocates for economic
liberty), AVA (a vendors association), and representatives from community
organizations in Little Village.25 The Coalition aimed to change the law and also to
develop the community resources and infrastructure that would allow vendors to
comply with likely regulatory requirements.26
SVJC pursued an incremental approach to reform. Because tamale vendors
were receiving the most pointed penalties from local police, even arrests, we focused
on relief for them. We drafted amendments to the code that expanded an existing
license (changing language that allowed vendors to sell packaged frozen desserts
that were prepared in a licensed facility to language that allowed vendors to sell
packaged food that was prepared in a licensed facility), thinking that would be easier
to pass. Our strategy was reinforced by policy officials who told us that the Health
Department would not support an ordinance that allowed food preparation—even
slicing fruit—on the carts. We planned that the next phase of reform would allow
vendors to prepare food on their carts.
It took several years to put the fire out for the tamalleros. We waged a multifaceted campaign, with outreach (or attempts at outreach) to vendors across the
city; public relations yielding favorable editorials in major papers and repeated
coverage in Spanish-language media;27 and a petition signed by thousands and sent
to City Council in a barrage of emails. We worked steadily with policymakers in the
20. Id.; Ronald Brownstein, Why the Time is Finally Right for “Amnesty,” THE ATLANTIC
(Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/why-the-time-is-finally-rightfor-amnesty/439218/ [https://perma.cc/J2R4-4NK4].
21. VENKATESH, supra note 6, at 119–20.
22. Sula, supra note 16.
23. See Press Release, Inst. for Justice (Aug. 17, 2011).
24. See Vivanco, supra note 10.
25. See Our Coalition, STREET VENDORS JUSTICE COALITION, https://streetvendorsjustice.
org/our-coalition/ [https://perma.cc/B5B6-EGXE] (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
26. See id.
27. See News, STREET VENDORS JUSTICE COALITION, https://streetvendorsjustice.org/
coalitionnews/ [https://perma.cc/YKQ3-E8ZA] (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
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Department of Health, pressing the argument that vendors could help ease food
deserts. We marshaled the city’s many strategic plans related to culture, pedestrian
life, healthy food, and immigration, as evidence that legalizing vending fit into the
city’s vision for itself.28 We introduced data that demonstrated sidewalk vendors are
not an extraordinary health risk29 and that they are a potential source of significant
tax revenue.30
The SVJC ordinance was introduced in City Council in May of 2014, but it did
not get a hearing.31 We were informed by the ordinance’s sponsor that some City
Council members refused to handle the issue in an election year. It seemed as
though aldermen did not want to take a public stand on the issue of legalizing
vendors when voters and donors were most attentive. The ordinance was
reintroduced in May of 2015 and passed in September.32 In the end, no opponents
spoke out, and the vote was unanimous.33 Vendors rallied and celebrated in City
Hall.
In the months after the ordinance was passed, many vendors have grown
anxious and discouraged about the law. The law does not allow food preparation
on the cart, and eloteros and fruteros do not know how to or whether to change the
way they have always sold their food. Some vendors cannot comply, because they
do not have access to affordable, nearby licensed kitchens. Others are scared that
the law will be enforced against license holders in unpredictable ways. Some have
tried and failed to take the sanitation manager test, which the city has said is required
for any vendor using a shared kitchen.34 Others had trouble pulling together the
money for the licenses required for cart and kitchen use, which amounted to nearly
$1000.35 In the first months after the law went into effect, no licenses were issued.36
A year later, five licenses had been issued, none to the members of AVA, the
vendors association in Little Village that led the campaign to create the license.37
Two years later, there was more hope but still few licenses. The vendors association

28. See STREET VENDORS JUSTICE COALITION, supra note 25.
29. ANGELA ERICKSON, INST. FOR JUSTICE, STREET EATS, SAFE EATS: HOW FOOD TRUCKS
AND CARTS STACK UP TO RESTAURANTS ON SANITATION 11 (2014).
30. Lucci & Gowins, supra note 18.
31. CITY OF CHI., OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK: LEGIS. DETAILS (May 20, 2015), https://
chicago.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1804150&GUID=203DE101-08DC-4A0D-A286ECBF17509F8F [https://perma.cc/5SLE-5K7H].
32. CITY OF CHI., OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK: LEGIS. DETAILS (Sept. 24, 2015), https://
chicago.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2321146&GUID=14EB1A4A-849A-4502-B254E9D19E6EADF0 [https://perma.cc/7JZ9-6DD6].
33. Id.
34. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE 4-8-036(a)(2) (1990).
35. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE 4-5-010(15) (1990) (amended Dec. 14, 2016).
36. Chicago Data Portal: Business Licenses, CITY OF CHI., https://data.cityofchicago.org/
Community-Economic-Development/Business-Licenses-Current-Active/uupf-x98q [https://
perma.cc/62DB-XYTC] (using the “Business Activity” filter with the following language: “Sales of
Previously Prepared Food That is Enclosed or Wrapped in Individual Portions From a Mobile Food
Vehicle”).
37. Id.
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rented a space to build out as their own shared kitchen, which takes capital and
expertise that they do not have, and City Council lowered the total licensing fees for
a cart and a shared kitchen user license to one hundred dollars.38
II. REASONS TO CAMPAIGN FOR LEGALIZATION OR WHY NOT LEAVE WELL
ENOUGH ALONE?
An activist’s or reformer’s first question must necessarily be, “What is the
problem that I will invest resources to solve?” Before attempting to intervene in the
delicate equilibrium (such as it is) of the shadow economy, one should explore
whether it is a needed and important intervention. In this Part, I will explore reasons
to intervene in the system that leaves sidewalk vendors in the shadows of the
economy, without a license or any way to get on the books.
A. Dignity and Desire
The most fundamental reason for me to campaign for legalization was the fact
that vendors asked me to. The leaders of a vendors association, centered in the
neighborhood of Little Village where many vendors operate, contacted me to tell
me about their plight and ask for my assistance. Many vendors in Little Village had
received tickets for selling without a license; they had appeared in administrative
hearings and received varying fines. They had been told that there was no license
for them to obtain. More poignant still, several tamale vendors had been arrested. I
heard the story of a woman who was arrested for selling her homemade tamales
from a table in front of her home. When her teenager asked why the officer was
arresting her, the fifteen-year-old was arrested too.
The stories of arrested tamale vendors are revealing. In an interview captured
on film, Claudia Perez tells how police officers gestured dismissively toward
the food she made by hand before the sun rose and said, “Throw away all
this . . . garbage.” “How can you call food ‘garbage?’” she asks and adds, “I cried
hard.”39 The treatment of her hard work was demeaning and hurtful. The insult to
her food is an insult to her skills, her cleanliness, and her labor. Echoing Perez’s
narrative, a vendor in Los Angeles said that the police “pick us up and move us, just
like bits of trash.”40 The penalties for their hard work are an indignity.
The gruff enforcement described only compounds the indignity of the
illegality itself. Outlawing the sale of food from carts denies people’s freedom to
38. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 4-5-010, 4-8-041 (amended Dec. 14, 2016) (provided in CITY OF
CHI., OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK: LEGIS. DETAILS 16 (Feb. 24, 2017), https://chicago.legistar.com/
LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2908291&GUID=1E650B27-A1C7-4EC5-8BB6-A20EC5BCFF8A&
Options=Advanced&Search= [https://perma.cc/PZ5D-QHYX]).
39. Ill. Pol’y Inst., Una Mujer y Su Carrito, Y OU T UBE (Feb. 13, 2015), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=bajmdHt-Dyc [https://perma.cc/7HRK-B6LK].
40. Gregg W. Kettles, Legal Responses to Sidewalk Vending: The Case of Los Angeles, California,
in STREET ENTREPRENEURS: PEOPLE, PLACE AND POLITICS IN LOCAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
58, 73 ( John Cross & Alfonso Morales eds., 2007) [hereinafter STREET ENTREPRENEURS] (citations
omitted).
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choose how to earn a living using their talents and their time. Freedom to earn a
living is fundamental to human dignity and autonomy and is a key component of
the pursuit of happiness.41 Telling people that their livelihood is illegitimate runs the
risk of conveying to them that they are illegitimate.42 The message is even harsher
when that livelihood is tied to a cultural identity that is particularly dear to
immigrants serving food from home in the fashion of home.
The expressive force of the proscription sends a message that poor people
without enough money to buy a food truck or set up a restaurant cannot serve
wholesome or desirable food. No matter how careful and clean they are, they cannot
get a license without a motor or a building. (Indeed, dozens of vendors in the
association had taken a food handling class and passed the test, but they were still
not allowed to sell the food they made from carts.) Their businesses are rejected
under the guise of a public health rule, without any actual screening or regard for
the safety of their businesses, leaving the vendors to believe the city assumes the
vendors themselves are impossibly unclean.
B. Discrimination and Discretion
Chicago allows food carts to operate in the park district, in summer festivals,
and in farmers markets, as well as food trucks to operate on the street, which
suggests that the businesses can be acceptably safe. There is a puzzling double
standard that allows the carts so many places but not on sidewalks. It is natural to
question whether the discrimination against carts on the sidewalk is pretextual.
In this respect, the ban on food carts on the sidewalks of Chicago is
reminiscent of the San Francisco ordinance in Yick Wo.43 In that case, the city
passed an ordinance stating that laundries needed special permission to operate,
unless they operated in buildings made of brick or stone.44 The commissioners
could reject an application for any reason or for no reason, and there were no
grounds to challenge or question their decision.45 The distinction between brick and
wooden laundries was classist and not particularly tied to fire safety. The
commissioners granted permits for wooden laundries to white applicants and not
to Chinese applicants.46

41. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 6 (1999); BERNARD H. SIEGAN,
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 250 (1980); Austin Raynor, Note, Economic Liberty
and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99 VA. L. REV. 1065, 1089–90 (2013) (comparing economic
liberty and occupational choice to the liberty interests protected in Lawrence v. Texas).
42. In contrast, community members urge cities to legalize vending to “recognize the value” of
street food and its contributions to the culture. Mark Vallianatos et al., Bringing People to Good Food and
Good Food to People: Enhancing Food Access Through Transportation and Land Use Policies, UEP
FACULTY & UEPI STAFF SCHOLARSHIP, Mar. 2011, at 14.
43. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 357 (1886).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 366.
46. Id. at 361.
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The necessary tendency, if not the specific purpose, of this ordinance, and
of enforcing it in the manner indicated in the record, is to drive out of
business all the numerous small laundries, especially those owned by
Chinese, and give a monopoly of the business to the large institutions
established and carried on by means of large associated Caucasian capital.47
A law that disallows the more affordable business structure, like the food cart,
may well be discriminatory against those with small budgets, especially the
immigrants and the historically poor. Historically, vendors have often been
immigrants and have often been restricted and marginalized by the government.48
Outlawing vendors can be a way to favor the established residents and keep the
immigrants and the poor out of sight. Indeed, the two major U.S. cities that have
maintained bans on traditional sidewalk food vendors in recent decades, Los
Angeles and Chicago, are the two cities with the greatest Mexican populations.49
In Yick Wo, the Court held that it was unacceptable that the livelihoods of
laundry operators in San Francisco could be decided arbitrarily by officials, saying
that the laundry operators were “tenants at will, under the supervisors, of their
means of living.”50 The Court further stated:
[T]he very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the
means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at
the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.51
Unlike the launderers in Yick Wo, vendors in Chicago could not apply for
licenses hoping that the officials’ discretion would bend their way. Yet, their fates
are similarly in the control of an unguided official. In a situation where there is a
sizable industry operating in the open in the shadow economy, and a law outlaws
the industry but is only occasionally enforced, there is a de facto grant of extreme
discretion to the police, which is troubling for the same reasons raised in Yick Wo.
The ban on food carts is so broad, in the context of a big city where many food

47.
48.

Id. at 362.
See, e.g., FARLEY ELLIOT, LOS ANGELES STREET FOOD: A HISTORY FROM TAMALEROS
TO TACO TRUCKS 19–24 (2015); ANDREW F. SMITH, FOOD AND DRINK IN AMERICAN HISTORY 871
(2013).
49. Tanvi Misra, Why Chicago Is Still the No. 2 U.S. City for Mexican Immigrants, CITYLAB
(Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2014/10/why-chicago-is-still-the-2-us-city-formexican-immigrants/381304/ [https://perma.cc/RE55-K46E]; see Dennis Romero, Street Vendors
Generate Half a Billion Dollars for L.A.’s Economy, Report Says, L.A. WEEKLY ( June 25, 2015),
http://www.laweekly.com/news/street-vendors-generate-half-a-billion-dollars-for-las-economyreport-says-5727233 [https://perma.cc/2EA3-DQR3].
50. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368.
51. Id. at 370. The Court has not maintained the position in Yick Wo that the freedom to earn
a living free of arbitrary or discriminatory restrictions is a fundamental liberty interest. Rather, it has
deferred to legislatures and applied only the rational basis test. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,
488 (1955). Yet, the work that we do is fundamentally tied to our human dignity, as well as our
autonomy and identity. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 250
(1980); Raynor, supra note 41, at 1089–90 (comparing economic liberty and occupational choice to the
liberty interests protected in Lawrence v. Texas).

Final to Printer_Kregor (Do Not Delete)

462

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

12/13/2017 2:49 PM

[ Vol. 7:453

carts do operate, that it gives law enforcement the power to act arbitrarily and
discriminatorily.52 The authority of the police to jail some people for trying to earn
a living and to destroy their businesses, not because their individual business
practices fail to comply with health and safety standards, but rather because the law
is so broad that police can arrest any vendor on a whim, is the kind of unfettered
discretion that defies an old-fashioned notion of the rule of law.
It is clear that giving and enforcing these notices may, and quite likely will,
bring ruin to the business of those against whom they are directed, while
others, from whom they are withheld, may be actually benefited by what
is thus done to their neighbors; and, when we remember that this action
or non-action may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal
or animosity, from favoritism and other improper influences and motives
easy of concealment and difficult to be detected and exposed, it becomes
unnecessary to suggest or to comment upon the injustice capable of being
brought under cover of such a power, for that becomes apparent to
everyone who gives to the subject a moment’s consideration. In fact, an
ordinance which clothes a single individual with such power hardly falls
within the domain of law, and we are constrained to pronounce it
inoperative and void.53
In fact, in Chicago’s neighborhood of Little Village, one police district
commander and one officer did target street vendors, especially tamale vendors,
while vendors in other districts operated without tickets or trouble.54 The power of
a police officer to act out of enmity or prejudice was absolute. And that power could
drive vendors out of their livelihoods. Though vendors in many neighborhoods
operated without reproach, the story of Little Village demonstrated that they were
all vulnerable to a change in leadership or law enforcement strategy.55 Without the
law to protect them, they were at the mercy of discretion. Legalizing sidewalk
vending was a strategy to restore the rule of law and allow vendors who met health
requirements to ply their trade, regardless of the prejudices or vendettas of the local

52. KATHLEEN STAUDT, FREE TRADE? INFORMAL ECONOMIES AT THE U.S.–MEXICO
BORDER 152 (1998) (describing how police enforced vending ordinances against Latino people only);
cf. William J. Stuntz, Terry and Substantive Law, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1362, 1365 (2012) (describing how
enforcement of drug laws leaves room for the police’s broad discretion and, as a result, discrimination).
53. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373 (quoting City of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217 (1878)).
54. Vendors told me that the officer who consistently ticketed or questioned vendors in Little
Village even ticketed a tamale vendor who was sitting in a Dunkin Donuts drinking a cup of coffee.
Cf. John C. Cross & Marina Karides, Capitalism, Modernity, and the “Appropriate” Use of Space, in
STREET ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 40, at 19, 20 (describing police officer’s varied responses to street
vendors).
55. See Ginny Browne et al., “Keep Your Wheels On”: Mediating Informality in the Food Cart
Industry, in THE INFORMAL AMERICAN CITY: BEYOND TACO TRUCKS AND DAY LABOR 257–58
(Vinit Mukhija & Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris eds., 2014) (“Portland’s vendors have benefited also
from a supportive public and a tolerant approach to enforcement. However, these soft forms of
regulation, not codified in law, are subject to change with the whims of the public and administrators,
and could easily shift to constrain rather than support food carts.”).
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police officer. Legalizing sidewalk vending was a strategy to protect the fundamental
liberty to earn a living under the same rules that apply to others in the industry.
The street vendors association operating in Little Village had tried to negotiate
with the police, and the police in the district did agree not to ticket fruteros, but the
police would not grant amnesty to the tamalleros. Vendors wanted to change the law
so that they could get a license.56 They wanted the dignity and security and equality
that a license would represent.57 And I tried to help achieve that goal.
C. Economic Development Interests
Legalizing sidewalk vending, so that vendors who met health and safety
requirements could obtain licenses to operate, had potential for significant
economic benefits for individuals, neighborhoods, and the city, as well as
protections for vendors’ liberty interests.
Entrepreneurs in the shadow economy stay small. As John Cross points out,
drawing heavily from Hernando de Soto, shadow entrepreneurs must weigh the
costs of evading law enforcement against the costs of penalties if they are caught.58
In our example, vendors in Little Village would regularly shut down their stands and
lose business during the morning hours when the police officer who targeted them
was on the beat. But they took the risk of operating in the open during other hours
and sometimes received tickets with $50 to $500 fines (plus a day of lost earnings
during the appearance at a hearing) or, as mentioned above, even arrests.
Sometimes, law enforcement forces shadow entrepreneurs to move away from
locations that are best for business.59 They cannot risk investing heavily in the
business.60 Indeed, in a survey of vendors in Chicago that asked about the biggest
impediment to their businesses, 45% answered legality and 36% answered lawenforcement harassment.61 Seventy-nine percent said they would expand their
businesses if they were legal.62 Growing businesses would create jobs, circulate
money in the local economy, and generate tax revenues.63
56. In a survey of vendors in Los Angeles, 50% of vendors said they would pay up to $100 for
a permit if one were available; 16% said they would pay for a permit “no matter its cost”; only 4% said
they would not pay for a permit. Vallianatos et al., supra note 42, at 11.
57. Vallianatos, A More Delicious City: How to Legalize Street Food, in THE INFORMAL
AMERICAN CITY, supra note 55, at 218 (“The desire for a permit by most surveyed vendors is notable.
Allowing vendors to transition to legal sales would help relieve them of the stress of facing inspectors,
confiscation of their vehicles, and fines.”).
58. CROSS, supra note 5, at 32–34.
59. Lucci & Gowins, supra note 18, at 11; see also Hannah Palmer Egan, The Illegal Underground
Economy Behind Churros, THE VILLAGE VOICE ( July 20, 2013), http://www.villagevoice.com/
restaurants/the-illegal-underground-economy-behind-churros-6438892 [https://perma.cc/D9C4EXSF] (describing multiple arrests of churro vendors in New York).
60. CROSS, supra note 5, at 34.
61. Lucci & Gowins, supra note 18, at 10.
62. Id. at 12.
63. Id.; Browne et al., supra note 55, at 248–49 (describing how the Portland government’s
interpretation of the law to allow food carts has made it possible for vending “to be a successful
economic development tool, providing jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities to those with limited
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In addition, permitting vendors to flourish would encourage many other
public goods. It would open the opportunity for small businesses to sell groceries
and wholesome prepared meals at affordable prices in neighborhoods that have few
large-scale grocery stores.64
Legal sidewalk vending can also improve the vitality and walkability of
cities by giving people a reason to walk and be outside. Increasing the
number of people on city sidewalks can also make neighborhoods safer by
ensuring more eyes on the street, and may have a positive spillover effect
on local stores as more people are out strolling and shopping.65
Legalizing an affordable business model would allow for more diversity among
entrepreneurs and would create more consumer choice. “Street and mobile food
also reflect the region’s cultural diversity and have become an increasingly popular
way for residents of all backgrounds to sample diverse cuisines and to experience a
vibrant street scene.”66 In particular, entrepreneurs who would not operate illegally
might join the industry after legalization and start promising new businesses.67
Vendors operating in the shadow economy are often people who are not able to
find other acceptable work, often due to discrimination: poor people, immigrants,
women, and people of color.68 For want of alternatives, they may be willing to
accept the constraints and indignities of operating against the law. But if the city
legalized the business model, other creative entrepreneurs might view it as an
opportunity to start a small business that reaches urban customers face to face and
conducts very affordable market research for new recipes or a new concept.
For one example, an entrepreneur named Sara Travis had a business plan for
a vending business in Chicago.69 She had commissioned designers to construct a
bicycle trailer equipped with kegs from which a vendor could dispense iced coffee
or iced tea.70 She planned to have a fleet of the bicycles selling throughout the city.71
Because the city had no license or body of regulations for the business, and because
there was no assurance that the investment in growing the business in Chicago
would be secure, the entrepreneur moved her business to Austin, Texas.72 If
Chicago had adopted a license structure for nonmotorized vendors quickly, the
resources”); cf. Nicholas R. Johnson & A. Bryan Endres, Small Producers, Big Hurdles: Barriers Facing
Producers of “Local Foods,” 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’ Y 49, 98 (2011) (describing the economic
benefits of food sales in farmers markets).
64. Vallianatos, supra note 57, at 218.
65. Id.
66. Vallianatos et al., supra note 42, at 21.
67. Cross & Karides, supra note 54, at 30.
68. Manuel Castells & Alejandro Portes, World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects
of the Informal Economy, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES IN ADVANCED AND LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 26 (Alejandro Portes et al. eds., 1989); Larson, supra note 1, at 141.
69. Entrepreneur: Sara Travis’ Brew Hub, Interview by Bill Moller with Sara Travis, WGN
RADIO (Aug. 31, 2013), http://wgnradio.com/2013/08/31/entrepreneur-sara-travis-the-brew-hub/
[https://perma.cc/5NGB-J8BF].
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Brew Hub might have created jobs and revenues and a spark of innovation in the
city. It might have even been a major corporate citizen someday.
Opening a city to entrepreneurs with plans for mobile food without a motor
makes economic sense. It allows more people to give business a try. It allows people
to test the market with their recipes and services. It allows people to spend and earn
money locally. It allows a few businesses to start small and eventually grow big. Our
campaign to legalize food carts was a campaign to build the entrepreneurial
ecosystem in Chicago.
III. CHALLENGES AND RISKS OF LEGALIZATION STRATEGY
A campaign to legalize street vendors is tortuously fraught. Unlike a campaign
to deregulate an occupation or industry so entrepreneurs have more flexibility and
freedom to operate or innovate, a legalization campaign is in essence a campaign to
regulate. There is no practical hope that the government will grant legal amnesty to
unregulated preparation and service of food, even if they decline to enforce the laws
against street vendors for the most part. Activists advocating for legalization must
be sensitive to the possible negative effects that the regulation might have (and
where it might make no difference at all) for the lives of vendors in the shadow
economy.
If the rule of law requires that all businesses meet the same standards of health
precautions and equipment specifications, and that the law be enforced equally
against all people, the rule of law is awfully tough on poor and marginalized
people.73 It may not in the end provide them with dignity and legitimacy but rather
taunt them with unattainable standards. Meanwhile, the amnesty that they might
desire would legalize substandard, dangerous businesses. This is what Larson calls
the conundrum of informality.74 “[U]nder conditions of economic inequality, do
ambitious and absolute regulatory standards advance or frustrate social justice?”75
And she points out that American lawyers are ill-equipped to deal with the
confounding problem.76
Regulation imposes a cost on all businesses, but the cost can be unbearable
for microbusinesses or individuals operating without strong networks or
resources.77 Indeed, the costs of compliance are often the reasons that businesses
operate in the shadow economy in the first place. Building up a set of regulations
will not, on its own, allow entrepreneurs to move out of the shadow economy into
the formal economy. “[U]nless the legislation can be implemented, it is doing no

73. Larson, supra note 1, at 144 (“To hold to formal equality in economic regulatory standards
and enforcement will harshly burden those already hardest pressed to survive the new economic
order.”).
74. Id. at 143.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 159.
77. Richard Epstein, The Moral and Practical Dilemmas of an Underground Economy, 103 YALE
L.J. 2157, 2165 (1994).

Final to Printer_Kregor (Do Not Delete)

466

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

12/13/2017 2:49 PM

[ Vol. 7:453

more than encouraging civil disobedience.”78 And it might destroy some informal
businesses if they tried to convert.79
Health and safety regulations for food businesses are particularly complicated
and costly, and they are difficult to eliminate.80 At the barest minimum, Chicago
would require food to be prepared in an inspected, licensed facility, whereas almost
all vendors in the shadow economy prepare their food in their home kitchens.81 The
cost of renting time in a commercial facility that meets all the myriad requirements
of a commercial kitchen could put vendors out of business. Here is a striking and
realistic assessment:
As one would-be cake baker in Texas noted: Say you are making a $50 cake,
which most people consider to be a lot for a birthday cake. It takes you
three hours to make the cake and you pay $15 an hour for the kitchen.
How does that work out? It doesn’t. You end up owing money on every
cake you make.82
If the regulations of food vendors are unaffordable for the vendors currently
operating in the shadow economy, they are still faced with a choice between
noncompliance and exit. In other words, they are in no different situation than they
are when there is no license at all.
Even more discouraging to the activist or public interest lawyer with an eye
toward reform, there is a risk that unlicensed vendors would be in a worse situation
with a license framework on the books than when their businesses were flatly illegal.
It is possible that a new law passed with the imprimatur of the current legislature
would give law enforcement a clearer directive to enforce the law. The police might
not be so fractured in their approach to the vendors, and they might not be
sympathetic to vendors who could get a license but did not.83 In a case like ours,
where the legislation passed covers only some vendors because the workable
lobbying strategy was to take an incremental approach, then some vendors might
78. Claire Moore Dickerson, Informal-Sector Entrepreneurs, Development and Formal Law: A
Functional Understanding of Business Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 179, 208 (2011).
79. John C. Cross & Alfonso Morales, Introduction: Locating Street Markets in the
Modern/Postmodern World, in STREET ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 40, at 1, 9 (“Policy designed to
develop the informal sector tends to ignore or minimize the potential or the benefits of street merchants
and underestimate the difficulties of making micro-businesses bear the development burden of formal
enterprises . . . . [ T ]hey potentially undermine the very factors that make many informal enterprises
successful while imposing formal rules that they are unable to deal with. From engaging in a flexible
and evolving economic activity focused on family subsistence needs (and often involving the avoidance
of control by authorities), they are sucked into a rigid set of rules that they can barely understand and
even less likely to be able to challenge or manipulate. While their businesses may be more ‘accountable’
they may in fact be less successful.”); CROSS, supra note 5, at 3 (“[I]t was often their ability to avoid
regulations and the payment of taxes and fees that made people in the informal economy profitable,
and this seemed to pose a political and moral dilemma: They were surviving largely because they were
breaking the rules.”).
80. Nina W. Tarr, Food Entrepreneurs and Food Safety Regulation, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’ Y 35
(2011).
81. Id.
82. Johnson & Endres, supra note 63, at 108.
83. Cross & Karides, supra note 54, at 20.
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be in the worst possible situation where enforcement is harsher, but they have no
way yet to obtain a license to protect themselves.
Finally, there is the concern that vendors who do try to comply with the rules
and obtain licenses will still be cited and fined and harassed and constrained in their
growth. The registration of vendors could make them easy to find, and the rules
they could violate would multiply.84 Instead of a citation for vending without a
license, vendors could be cited for multiple violations if they break rules about
where, when, and how to vend.85 Sidewalk vendors in New York City, many of
whom have licenses, are ticketed all the time, especially for violations of
administrative rules about where they can be and for how long.86 Indeed, the tickets
for administrative or spatial violations outnumber the tickets for violations of the
health code three to one.87 If the costs of enforcement are as high or higher after
getting a license, vendors will still try to evade law enforcement and they will not
invest in the business, either in growth or in the equipment and safeguards required
to get a license.88
If the well-resourced entrepreneurs, who did not operate as vendors when it
could be done only in the shadow economy, are the only ones who can survive after
legalization, then many of the goals of legalization are thwarted. “One of the great
challenges of formalization is that it can displace the most vulnerable residents of
an informal settlement. . . . [F]ormalization can be a moment when inequality is
deepened.”89
Scholars have argued that activists and reformers should focus efforts on
minimizing the enforcement of regulatory standards on entrepreneurs in the
shadow economy, rather than on trying to change the laws.90 They praise
development experts and economists who understand “that the informal sector is a
healthy and adaptive response to existing realities.” Meanwhile, they deride those
who engage in “magical thinking” by indulging a belief “that a government can
create an effective legal system by merely waving the legislative wand.”91 Yet,
entrepreneurs in the informal economy are highly vulnerable in the absence of a

84. STAUDT, supra note 52, at 153 (“The newly invented arrangement offered striking
surveillance capabilities, should the police use their time to monitor compliance.”).
85. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 512–
23 (2001) (explaining how prosecutors’ ability to “stack” charges for overlapping crimes alarmingly
increases their leverage over defendants).
86. Gregg Kettles, Crystals, Mud, and Space: Street Vending Informality, in THE INFORMAL
AMERICAN CITY, supra note 55, at 227, 229.
87. Id. at 237.
88. CROSS, supra note 5, at 34.
89. Ananya Roy, Urban Informality: Toward an Epistemology of Planning, 71 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’ N
147, 153 (2005).
90. CROSS, supra note 5, at 60.
91. Dickerson, supra note 78, at 182–83.
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legal path, and many potential entrepreneurs will opt out of creating jobs because
they are unwilling to invest in such uncertain circumstances.92
IV. STRATEGY FOR LEGALIZATION
For a legalization campaign to be successful meeting the goals set forth in Part
II, as well as addressing the challenges set forth in Part III, the cost-benefit package
of having a license has to make sense for the entrepreneurs who currently operate
in the informal economy, as well as new entrants. Compliance has to be affordable
and workable for entrepreneurs formerly in the shadow economy if the reform
is to provide them the dignity, security, potential, and opportunity of converting
to the formal economy. Here I will present some (hopefully) practical
recommendations and strategies for designing such a campaign.
First, the regulations of the business must be minimal, so as not to impose
unnecessary costs on compliance.93 The license fee should be as low as possible and
reformers should urge the lawmakers to consider the package of costs that license
applicants must afford. In Chicago, the City Council helpfully lowered fees after
recognizing the initial package was too costly. While the ordinance that was initially
introduced set a license fee of $100, equal to the license fee for a peddler’s license,94
the ordinance that passed set the license fee at $350.95 Vendors who wished to
prepare their own food in a shared commercial kitchen also faced the cost of a
shared kitchen user license, with a fee of $330.96 There is some uncertainty whether
every shared kitchen user must also have a certified sanitation manager on staff.97
The training, materials, and test for that certificate also usually cost around $200.98
Even after spending the money, many members of the Little Village vendors
association have struggled to pass the test, given their limited schooling and literacy.
With licensure costs approaching $1000, even before accounting for upgrades to
carts and rent for a shared kitchen space, legality was an overwhelming expense for
92. Larson, supra note 1, at 177 (quoting SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: ESSAYS ON THE NEW MOBILITY OF PEOPLE AND MONEY 166 (1998)).
93. STAUDT, supra note 52, at 153 (describing a reform measure that increased the start-up costs
for vendors by ten times).
94. Chi., Ill., Mun. Code Ordinance No. O2014-4212, 2014 Chi. City Council (Ill. 2014),
https://chicago.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1804150&GUID=203DE101-08DC-4A0DA286-ECBF17509F8F&Options=Advanced&Search [https://perma.cc/7Q4H-VHTL] (failed to
pass).
95. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 4-8-010, 7-38-130, 7-38-140.
96. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-5-010(15) (amended Dec. 14, 2016)..
97. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-8-039(e)(3) (1990) (“At all times that potentially hazardous food
is being prepared, tasted, handled, packaged, prepared for storage, served or otherwise used at a shared
kitchen by a shared kitchen user, such shared kitchen user shall have on site at the shared kitchen a
person who holds a current sanitation certificate issued by the department of health.”).
98. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, AM. ACADEMY OF FOOD SAFETY, http://
www.aafoodsafety.com/faq.html [https://perma.cc/NHH5-LHXB] (last visited Sept. 16, 2016);
ServSafe Food Service Sanitation Manager Certification & Renewal, ILL. RESTAURANT ASS’ N , http://
www.illinoisrestaurants.org/?page=SanitationCertif [https://perma.cc/7FC7-WHN3] (last visited
Sept. 16, 2016).
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many low-income entrepreneurs. Because licensure is not a guaranteed exemption
from tickets and citations in the future (because, for example, some officials have
told vendors they may not stay in place for any certain length of time), the cost is
particularly discouraging. If a goal of reform is converting vendors from the
informal economy to the formal economy, the price of conversion should be lower.
Accordingly, Chicago lowered the cart license fee and waived the shared kitchen
user license fee for vendors, so both licenses now cost $100.99
In addition, regulatory requirements for vendors should be focused only on
ensuring health and safety rather than placing extra burdens on entrepreneurs in the
name of aesthetics or market engineering. Regulations that are not tied to such
crucial public purposes raise questions about why they are there in the first place.
As in Yick Wo, vendors might conclude that they are pretextual and are put in place
for an improper purpose, such as protectionism or prejudice.100 Vendors might get
the sense that the law is there simply to present them with unattainable standards
or to squeeze them out. Laws that reasonably require basic health standards are
more likely to accrue respect for the rule of law.
If the new regulations avoid the nitty-gritty laws about where vendors can
operate and focus on the health code, then it is quite possible that the costs of
harassment will be low. Gregg Kettles analyzed over 100,000 citations issued to
vendors in New York City and found that law enforcement is much more likely to
cite people for violating “crystal” rules than “mud” rules and much more likely to
cite people for violating spatial rules than health rules.101 Vending laws that simply
hold vendors to standards that they are safe, sanitary, and wholesome will hold them
to the standard of care that we want to apply to all food businesses without giving
law enforcement easy hooks for tickets.
This approach has the added benefit of being the constitutional one. The
government should employ its police power and limit people’s economic liberty
only in the public interest. Courts can and should strike down laws that restrict
people’s ability to earn a living without any tie to a legitimate, public purpose.102
Lobbying successfully for simple regulations focused exclusively on food
safety can be a challenge. Special interest groups might fight for caps or spatial rules
or time limits out of protectionist or prejudiced motivations.103 Meanwhile, the
99.
100.
101.

CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-8-041(c), 4-5-010(15) (amended Dec. 14, 2016).
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373.
Kettles, Crystals, Mud, and Space: Street Vending Informality, in THE INFORMAL
AMERICAN CITY, supra note 55, at 235.
102. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2013); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312
F.3d 220, 222 (6th Cir. 2002); People v. Ala Carte Catering Co., 98 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 9 (1979)
(holding that a requirement that food trucks be 100 feet away from a restaurant entrance violated
Fourteenth Amendment); Order Following Demurrer Hearing, People v. Garcia, Case No 8EA05884,
*7 (Cal. Supp. filed Aug. 27, 2008) (“Garcia Order”) (holding that time limits on food trucks were
arbitrary as related to public safety and wholly lacking a rational basis as required by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
103. Regina Austin, “An Honest Living”: Street Vendors, Municipal Regulation, and the Black
Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119, 2121–22 (1993).
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consumers who ought to care about food safety as well as diversity of choice are
unlikely to participate in the political process that shapes the ordinance.
Activists can try to provide information to lawmakers and policymakers that
support a light touch for regulation. They can harness the grassroots lobbying power
of the consumers through petition campaigns and public media. Stories abound of
cities’ efforts to over-regulate vendors and the failures that ensued;104 they should
be wielded as cautionary tales. And the lure of revenue from license fees and taxes
should be clearly conditioned on regulations that make formalization affordable.105
Some health and safety regulations are unavoidable. The question becomes
how to make them affordable. Larson suggests an approach of regularization, in
which the law requires everyone to do the most he can toward safety standards.106
Regularization has the advantage of uniformity—the same law applies to
everyone—while giving poor people the permission to do only what they can
manage. It also moves people gradually toward full compliance, with the assumption
that they will continue to improve safety features as they spend what they can afford
each year.
Regularization is hard to square with health requirements for businesses,
particularly food businesses. Larson does not specify how officials would figure out
the proper percentage of assets that constitutes one’s “realistic capacity” to make
one’s home safe.107 That would be difficult to do, but it is likely even harder to do
in the context of entrepreneurship. We assume that people need housing, but we
do not assume that people need to be self-employed. We might accept that people
do the best they can for themselves, but we might reasonably determine that there
is a threshold level of food safety that we require of people who are selling food to
others.
Larson’s legal specification for regularization is impractical in the context of
underground food businesses, but it is useful to think of legal structures that would
allow people to start small and with a lower standard of regulatory compliance. Such
laws would form a background context that could make the formalization of
businesses more plausible.

104. See, e.g., Nate Berg, How to Stop the Over-Regulation of Street Vendors, THE ATLANTIC CITY
LAB ( June 12, 2012), http://www.citylab.com/work/2012/06/enabling-street-vendors-becomesmall-businesses/2254/ [https://perma.cc/XS2E-X6JN]; Controversy Erupts Over Regulating Mobile
Food Vendors, ENID NEWS & EAGLE (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.enidnews.com/news/controversyerupts-over-regulating-mobile-food-vendors/article_fe184bc8-c2ef-11e4-9ef0-af2de944a239.html
[https://perma.cc/8W7Q-7PKZ].
105. This strategy might have an added advantage of sowing sympathy for vendors in the minds
of policymakers (or at least a healthy respect or fear of public relations problems if they are perceived
as harsh). Even if explicit amnesty is not feasible, policymakers may provide flexibility and a grace
period so vendors can comply with new regulations. Chicago officials have communicated that they
will wait to enforce the new law against vendors so that they have time to comply. I am unaware of
citations for violations of the new law after six months.
106. Larson, supra note 1, at 180.
107. Id.
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There are examples and models for regulatory structures that lessen the costs
of regulatory compliance for small businesses or service to the poor, even in the
realm of sensitive areas of public health and safety. Cottage food laws allow people
to prepare nonhazardous foods in their home kitchens, often capped by a limit on
the revenues they can make there.108 These laws allow people to start small and push
them to move to inspected kitchens with commercial-grade equipment only if they
reach some level of success.109 There is evidence that the relaxed health standards
do result in more businesses (or at least more registered businesses).110 Some states
similarly eliminate or reduce regulatory burdens on food service operations run out
of houses of worship, especially related to soup kitchens.111 Analogies can be drawn
to home-based day cares, which do not have to meet all the same building
requirements as day cares in commercial locations.
Even if states or municipalities refuse to sanction preparation of hazardous
foods in home kitchens, they might allow food businesses to prepare food in
existing community kitchens without applying all the same requirements of a
commercial kitchen. One supervisor with the proper training and sanitation
certificate could oversee the activities of multiple vendors, so that each vendor
would not have to pass a rigorous test. Rent would be more affordable to use a
kitchen that was not so expensive to build out and license, and the requirement
might move food preparation out of home kitchens where there are pets and
residents who are disconnected from the business. If the legislature wants to push
businesses toward higher standards as they grow, the permission could be granted
only for kitchen users of a certain size or only for nonmotorized vendors. The
measure would help entrepreneurs transition gradually to the formal economy.
One of the most affordable small kitchens might be the cart itself. Reformers
should push lawmakers to allow preparation of food on the cart. Chicago’s
incremental approach, allowing the sale of pre-packaged food only, exacerbates the
cost of compliance. When all the corn and mayo and butter and cheese and pepper
(the ingredients for elotes) must be mixed and packaged in advance, vendors have to
pay more for rent in a shared kitchen, pay more for packaging, and lose more money
in waste because they cannot prepare the food to the customer’s order. Indeed, food
108. ALLI CONDRA, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FOOD LAW AND POLICY CLINIC, COTTAGE
FOOD LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 14–15 (Aug. 2013), http://www.chlpi.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/12/FINAL_Cottage-Food-Laws-Report_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/KEM9H5GW]. For a helpful digest of cottage food laws around the country, see Cottage Food Laws,
FORRAGER.COM, http://forrager.com/laws/ [https://perma.cc/WEZ8-545B] (last visited Sept. 16,
2016).
109. Id.
110. Is Lemonade Legal? Testing the Limits of Silliness in East Texas, THE ECONOMIST ( July 11,
2015), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21657409-testing-limits-silliness-east-texaslemonade-legal [https://perma.cc/YF4U-YRKD].
111. See, e.g., 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (2012) (exempting churches from retail food
establishment license requirements); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-36 (2015) (exempting volunteer-based
soup kitchens); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 143-A:5-a (1995) (allowing for a license exemption for soup
kitchens).
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preparation at the cart has added health benefits. The food is fresher, and the
customer can examine the conditions of its preparation more critically than most
food from a restaurant. If the business is small enough to contain its inventory and
food preparation activities on the cart, it should be allowed to do so.
Finally, after lobbying for laws that make compliance workable for poor
vendors, activists and reformers can help the vendors comply. The legal changes
will not be enough to allow vendors to succeed, and they may even make survival
harder at first. But communities and collectives can join forces to build the
resources that vendors will need. In Chicago, the vendors association has begun to
plan for its own commercial kitchen and its own program to assist vendors in
obtaining licenses. If regulators are accepting of creative new approaches to build
safe kitchens, then the change in the law will finally be worth celebrating.
CONCLUSION
Laws that broadly outlaw honest entrepreneurship in its most affordable forms
are degrading to vulnerable people and foolishly limiting for the economy. Yet, the
path for public interest lawyers and activists advocating for entrepreneurs’
economic liberty can be tricky. By focusing on real people whose livelihoods are on
the line, we can design a strategy for law reform that is workable. To allow vendors
to transition successfully to the formal economy, fees must be low, regulations must
be limited to issues related to health and safety, and options for microbusinesses to
start in spaces without all the refinement of restaurant kitchens must be available.

